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SITUATION

II

INDEPENDENT PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
Admitting that the Philippine Islands have been
granted independence under the provisions of the proposed Act of January 17, 1933/ ho'v should a seaplane
of state X, \vhich is under its O\Vll po·wer and not dependent upon any ship, be regarded and what should be
its treabnent after arrival in the Port of Manila.
(a) By the Philippine Govern1nent?
(b) By the YanLba, a vessel of war of state Y which
has been in l\1anila 20 hours~
( o) By the 1Va1nba, a vessel of 'var of state N, which
is convoying Iner.chant vessels of neutral states?
(d) By the Usa, a vessel of war of the United States~
SOLUTION

1. In case the Philippine Islands obtain independence
and are not neutralized :
(a) The Philippine Governn1ent should intern the seaplane.
(b) The Y aJtnba may request assurances from the
Philippine Governn1ent to the effect that the seaplane
has been or immediately will be interned.
(c) The Nam~ba may inquire \vhether the seaplane has
been or im1nediately is to be interned and may govern
its movements accordingly.
1
This act was rejected by resolution of the Philippine Legislature October 17, 1933, and the act of March 2,4, 1934, was accepted by a resolution
of May 1, 193·4. These acts are p>rinted at the end of the discussion of
this1 Situation II. See post pp. 111, 127.
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(d) The Usa has no legal concern with the matter.
2. In case the Philippine Islands are neutralized:
(a) 'The Philippine Government should intern the
seaplane.
(b) If state Y is a party to the neutralization treaty,
the Y a1nba may perform such services as rest upon that
Yessel under the treaty but if state Y is not a party to
the treaty, even though other states may be parties, the
1 an~ba 1nay request assurances from the Philippine Government to the effect that the sea plane has been or inlnledia tely will be interned.
(c) If state N is a party to the neutralization treaty,
the N a1nba 1nay perforn1 such services as rest upon that
vessel under the treaty but if state N is not a party to
the treaty even though other states 1nay be parties, the
J\T an~ba 1nay inquire 'vhether the seaplane has been or
iinmediately is to be interned and 1nay govern its Inovements accordingly.
(d) If the Urrited States is, as 1nay be inferred fron1
the Act of January 17, 1933, a party to the treaty of
neutralization, the Usa 1nay perfor1n such services as rest
upon that vessel under the treaty but if the United States
is not a party, even though other states may be parties,
the Usa has no legal concern 'vith the matter.
7

NOTES

1

Independence of Philippine Islands.-If section 10 of
the Act of January 17, 1933, had been brought into effect
by a favorable vote instead of being defeated by an unfavorable vote, conditions 'vould have iinplied a considerable change in the conduct of A1nerican affairs in the
'vestern Pacific Ocean. By this act the Philippine Islands
were to become "a separate and self-governing nation"
and their officials 'vere to become " officers of the free and
independent govern1nent of the Philippine Islands." The
1 These notes were based upon the hypotheSis admitting independence
under provisions of the act of January 17, 1033. Section 11, in regard
to neutralization, is identical in the act of 1933 and in the act of 1934.

NEUTRALIZATION

President o:f the United States is requested at the earliest
practicable date to open negotiations with :foreign powers
looking to the perpetual neutralization o:f the Islands.
This date might prestunably be as soon as the vote :favorable to independence under conditions o:f the 1933 act had
been taken 'vith vie'v to launching the Common,vealth o:f
the Philippine Islands as a perpetually neutralized state.
Independence and neutralization.-By section 10 o:f the
Act o:f January 17, 1933, the independence o:f the Philippine Islands 'vas to be recognized 10 years a:fter the new
govern1nent under the constitution should be set up and
all sovereignty o:f the United States was to be withdrawn.
Under section 12, the President o:f the United States was
to invite other states to recognize the independence o:f
the Islands. This independence does not seem to be dependent upon the neutralization o:f the Islands though
the 'vording ·o:f section 11 seems to anticipate that the
negotiation o:f a neutralization ~reaty may precede independence. By this section, the President is requested
"at the earliest practicable date " to negotiate :for neutralization, "i:f and vvhen Philippine independence shall
have been achieved."
Situation II 1nay there:fore be considered :from t'vo
points o:f vie,v, i.e., the Philippine Islands may be independent and neutralized or the Philippine Islands may
be independent but not neutralized.
Neutralization agree1nents.-N eutralization agreements have long been common and o:ften have been regarded as satisfactory methods o:f solving perplexing or
otherwise insolvable difficulties. Broadly these agreements have been unilateral or multilateral, i.e., one or •
more states have signed an agreement to the effect that
each would respect the neutrality o:f a named area or
entity, or states have agreed with one another that they
would maintain the neutrality o:f a named area or entity.
N eutraliz(J)tion.-Some type of neutralization has o:ften
been resorted to when a state or states may be uncertain
as to the immediate policy to be pursued in regard to the
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subject of neutralization. Often there has been created
by the adoption of the phrase in conventional framework a sense of security which subsequent events have
sho,vn to be visionary. Like other international agreements, however, the relations depend upon the nature of the obligations assumed. Many of the treaties
and conventions providing for neutralization fix the
period as " in perpetuity ", " forever ", "lasting ", etc.
A review of these treaties sho,vs that these 'vords have
been very loosely used. Even the clause of the Treaty
of Vienna, 1815, relating to neutralization 'vas not
strictly observed. The provisions were that " the town
of Craco'v, with its territory, is declared to be forever
a free, independent, and strictly neutral city, under the
protection of Austria, Russia and Prussia", 'vith the
further provision that " the Courts of Russia, Austria,
and Prussia engage to respect and to cause to be always
respected, the neutrality of the free town of Cracow and
its territory." The action of these powers in 1846 in
annexing this territory to Austria showed that such .
ter1ns as " forever " and " al 'va ys " 'ver;e not to be taken
ljterally. Action under other similar treaties sho,vs that
"perpetual" and like 'vords used in neutralization
agreen1ents i1nplies that no predetermined date has been
fixed upon for termination of the neutralized status and
little more. It is a fact that S-witzerland has been considered as neutralized and that at Paris, N ove1nber 20,
1815, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and
Russia, ackno,vledged, "in the 1nost formal 1nanner, by
the present act that the neutrality and inviolability of
s,vitzerland and her independence of all foreign influence, enter into the true interests of the policy ot the
\Vhole of Europe." s,vitzerland has, ho,vever, froln tin1e
to time as wars arose infor1ned the foreign powers that
the government 'vould " 1naintain and defend " her neutrality by all the n1eans in her po,ver and s,vitzerland
bas ordinarily had a 'veil-trained army.
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Luxemburg neutralized under the Great Powers in
1867 and 'vithout defenses "ras a n1atter of controversy
during the Franco-Prussian 'Var, 1870, and overrun during the 'Vorld vV ar, troops entering as early as August
2, 1914. Lord Stanley, 'vho had participated in the
negotiation of the treaty in regard to the neutralization
of Luxe1nburg, said of the obligation, " Such a guarantee
has obYiously rather the character of a moral sanction to
the arrangements which it defends than that of a contingent liability to make war."
In the treaty of 1831 in regard to Belgiu1n, it was
agreed that it " shall for1n an independent and perpetually neutral state " and this was reaffirmed in 1839.
In the Franco-Prussian 'Var, however, Great Britain
made treaties 'vith France and with Prussia to the effect
that if either should violate Belgian territory, Great Britain 'vould for the defense of Belgium go in on the side of
the other. 'Vhether the simple In oral sanction would have
been sufficient to secure respect for the Belgian neutrality
seen1s at least to have been doubted by the three po,vers
parties to these treaties of 1870. Their doubts seen1 to
have been justified by events of 1914.
It 'Yould see1n fro1n instances of neutralization that the
risks consequent upon violation of neutralization agreeInents should be at least co1nn1ensurate to the advantages 'vhich might be anticipated fro1n disregard of
these agreements as such sanctions only have proven
effective.
Belgian position, 1914.-Belgium 'vas in early 1914
under the provisions of the neutralization treaty, but
had· maintained an army and fortifications. The note
communicated to the German Minister by the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Davignon, on August 3,
1914, at 7 a.m. shows the official attitude to,vard the
condition that had arisen as follo,vs :
The Gern1an Government stated in their note of August 2, 1914,
that according to reliable information French forces intended to
march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium,
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in spite of the best intentions, 'vould not be in a position to
repulse, 'vithout assistance, an advance of French troops.
The Gennan Government, therefore, considered then1selves
compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian
·G overn1nent to adopt a friendly attitude toward her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the
Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added
that if Belgium put difficulties in the 'vay of the advance· of
Gennan troops, Germany 'vould be con1pelled to consider her us
.an enemy, and to leave the ultin1ate adjustinent of the relations
between the two States to the decision of arms.
This note has 1nade a deep and painful impression upon the
.Belgian Government.
The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in
the name of the French Government.
l\1oreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian arm;y 'vould offer the most
vigorous resistance to the invader.
The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch
for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the po,vers, and notably of the Government of His
Majesty the I{ing of Prussia.
Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she J:?.as carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality and she has left nothing undone to n1aintain and enforce
respect for her neutrality.
The attack upon her independence ·with which the German
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international la,v. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of
law.
The Belgian Government, if they 'vere to accept the proposals
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and
betray their duty toward Europe.
Conscious of the part 'vhich Belgium has played for more · than
-8 0 years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe
that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the
price of the violation of her neutrality.
If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are fir1nly
resolved to repel, by all the m·eans in their power, every attack
llpon their rights. (1917 Naval "\Var College, International Law
T>ocuments, p. 53.)
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The next day the Ger1nan l\1inister was handed his
passports and the British, French, and Russian · ministers \Vere " as guaranteeing po,vers " requested to cooperate in the defense of Belgian territory.
On August 4, all Belgian diplon1atic representatives
abroad \Vere instructed to bring the action of their govern1nent to the attention of the states to \vhich they
\Yere accredited.
A few days later the hope \vas officially expressed
that the regin1e of neutralization \Vould be pern1itted to
continue in the Belgian dependencies in Africa particularly referring to the General Act of the Berlin Conference signed )j.,ebruary 26, 1885, and article 11.
"\Vhen the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war was
receiYed, the Belgian Govern1nent replied, August 29,
1914, in a 1nanner showing recognition of Belgian obligations under the treaty of neutralization, saying,
Belgiu1n has always entertained friendly relations 'vith all
her neighbors without distinction. She had scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she
has not been able to accept Gern1any's proposals, it is because
these proposals contemplated the Yiolation of her engagements
toward Europe, engagements which forn1 the conditions of the
creation of the Belgian l(ingclom. She has been unable to admit
that a people, boweYer weak they may be, can fail in their duty
and sacrifice their honor by ~yielding to force. The government
lun·e waited, not only until the ultimatun1 had expired, but also
until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops,
before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantorF' of her
neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and AustriaHungary, to cooperate in the na1ne and in virtue of the treaties
in defense of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by
force of arn1s, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid
down by the provisions of article 10 of the Hague Convention
respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers.
Gernu1ny herself has recognized that her attack constitutes
a violation of international law, nnd, being unable to justify it,
she has pleaded her strategical interests.
Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgiun1 contrary
to the 1nost primitive demands of humanity. (Ibid., p. 58.)
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Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.-As under
section 11 of the Act of January 17, 1933, the President
of the United States is requested to enter upon negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands,
the American Government would naturally be supposed
to have a plan to suggest and to be prepared to become a
party to the " perpetual neutralization." The negotiation is not by the Act restricted to any specified powers
but would seem to imply that the invitation to negotiate might be to all powers desiring to take part in
the negotiation, at least, the po,vers Inentioned in section 12, viz: those in diplomatic correspondence with the
United States 'vould expect to be invited as these are to
be invited to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands when it is attained.
There would be certain complications owing to existing treaties in regard to relations in the ·western Pacific.
The Washington Conference of 1921-22 'vas not merely
upon limitation of armament but also according to the
official agenda upon Pacific and Far Eastern questions.
It was recognized in this Conference that naval power
1night be conditioned on other factors than ships and
article XIX of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament
contained the follo,ving provisions :
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that
the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty,
with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained
in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder.
(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds
or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those
adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama
Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the
Ha-waiian Islands ;
(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British
Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean,
east of the meridian of 110° east longitude; except (a) those
adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Conunonwealth of AustraHa and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
( 3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan
in the Pacific Ocean, to wit; the l{urile Islands, the Bonin Islands,
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Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores,
and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean
which Japan may hereafter acquire.
The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be
established iil the territories and possessions specified; that no
measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for
the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase
shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time
of peace. (1921 Naval "\Var College, International Law Docunlents, p. 301.)

If the neutralization of the Philippine Islands takes
place, it \vill evidently be of an area of which the military
status is already subject to international restriction.
Subject to these restrictions the Philippine Islands \vould
be unable to establish any very strong military po\ver.
The \vithholding of the military and naval bases limited
to the strength of February 6, 1921, \Vould scarcely be of
great value to the United States as these areas would be
open to attack and occupation by any enemy in time of
war \vhile adjacent Philippine areas \vould be neutralized.
A1ne1'·ican co1n1nitJnents in the Philippines.-Under
article 3 of the Treaty of 1898, Spain ceded to the United
States the Philippine Islands and the United States paid
Spain $20,000,000. Under other articles of this treaty
Spanish ships and 1nerchandise were for a period of
ten years to be achnitted to the Islands on the sa1ne terms
as American, the return of prisoners of \Var and disposition of other persons \Vere provided for, outstanding
claims were allocated, and all public properties of Spain
such as buildings, \Yharves, military structures, public
highways, and other immovable property passed to the
United States.
At the Washington Conference of Limitation of Naval
Armament, 1921, Japan wished assurances as to the attitude of the United States and Great Britain to\vard
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jncrease of :fortifications and na Yal bases in the Pacific.
After discussion, article XIX, 1nentioned above, was inbertecl in the Treaty Li1niting Naval Arma1nent. Ho'v
far such a restriction would be embodied in any agr.eement setting up a Philippine state should be a matter of
careful consideration.
Under the Act of January 17, 1933, the proposal of
section 5 'vas that " land or other property " which had
been designated by the President of the United States
for military and other reservations of the Govern1uent
of the United States should not pass to the Philippine
Governn1ent, and 1nay be redesignated by the President
\vi thin 2 years after the procla1nation of withdrawal of
the sovereignty of the United States. I£ neutralization
should take place under section 11 of the Act, the value
to the United States of military bases in the status quo of
1922 in a foreign state 'vould be doubtful.
Neutralization of Panam£a Canal.-ln the prea1nble of
the treaty bet-ween the United States and Great Britain,
1901, regarding the Panama Canal 1nention is 1nade of
the "general principle" of neutralization and in article
3 this is referred to as substantially that " embodied in
the Convention of. Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal,"
VIZ:

1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and of 'var of all nations obserYing these rules, on terms of entire equality so that there shall be no discrimination against any
such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and
charges of traffic shall be just and equitable.
2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of
war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed "'ithin
it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain
sueh military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.
3. Vessels of war of a bellige·rent shall not revictual nor take
any stores in the canal except so far as nul.y be strictly necessary;
and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected
with the least possible delay in accordanse with the regulation~
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in force , and with only such intermission as may result from the
necessities of the service.
Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as
vessels of war of the belligerents.
4. No belligerent shall en1bark or disembark troops, munitions
of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case- of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall
be resumed with all possible dispatch.
5. The proYisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent
to the canal, within 3 marine 1niles of either end. Vessels of war
of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than 24
hours at any one tilne, except in case of distress, and in such case,
shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within 24 hours from the departure of a
vessel of war of the other belligerent.
6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all work necessary
to the construction, nutintenance, and operation of the canal shall
be deenwd to be part thereof, for the purposes of this treaty, and
in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity
from attack or injury by beiligerents, and from acts calculated to
impair their usefulness as part of the canal. ( 32 U .S.Stat., Pt. II,
pp. 1903, 1904.) (1929 NaYal 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 22.)

LVe·u tralization of Aaland Islands; 1921.-0ne of the
n1ore recent conventions relating to neutralization was
that in regard to the Aaland Islands signed by the states
bordering on the Baltic and by British and Italian
representatives, October 22, 1921. This convention,
which defines the area of the Aaland Islands in article
2, had as its object " the nonfortification and neutralization of the Aalancl Islands in order that these islands
1nay never beco1ne a cause of danger from the 1nilitary
point of vie\v " and for the 1naintenance of this ai1n the
po\vers n1ay individually or jointly ask the Council of
the League of Nations to decide upon the 1neasures to be
taken and the parties to the convention agree to assist
in these n1easures. The method of determining upon the
1neasures was outlined as follows:
'Vhen, for the purposes of tl!is undertaking, the Council is
called upon to make a decision under the above conditions, it
will inYite the Po,vers which are parties to the present ConYen-

58

INDEPENDENT PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

tion, whether l\fen1bers of the League or not, to sit on the
Council. The vote of the representative of the Po\Ver accused of
having violated the provisions of this Convention shall not be
necessary to constitute the unanhnity required for the Council's
decision.
If unanin1ity cannot be obtained, each of the High Contracting
Parties shall be entitled to take any 1neasures which the Council
by a two-thirds 1najority recommends, the vote of the representa·
tive of the Power accused of having violated the provisions of
this Convention not being counted. (1924 Naval "\Var College,
International Law Docun1ents, p. 59.)

That the high contracting parties " undertake to assist " or are " entitled to take any measures 'vhich the
Council by a t"\vo-thirds 1najority recommends" does not
necessarily co1n1nit any of the high contracting parties
to any predetermined action as, these po,vers 'vould be
n1e1nbers of the council for deciding the measures to be
taken.
The Aaland Islands re1nain an integral part of the
Republic of Finland and Finland may take 1neasures for
the defense of the neutrality of the islands and of the
Finnish 1nainland in case of sudden attack and pending
intervention by the high contracting parties under tern1s
of the convention.
Civ-il and military aircraft.-In 1919 a convention for
the regulation of aerial navigation was signed at Paris.
The general prov]sions of this convention have been approved and have been embodied in other agreen1ents and
proposed agreements. Distinction 'vas made between
private and state aircraft and also in the categories of
state aircraft. Son1e restrictions were also imposed
upon aircraft.
ART. 30. The following shall be deemed to be State aircraft:
(a) Military aircraft.
(b) Aircraft exclusively en1ployed in State service·, such as
posts, custon1s, police.
Every other aircraft shall be deen1ed to be a private aircraft.
All state aircraft other than n1ilitary, customs and police aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be
subject to all the provisions of the present Convention.
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ART. 31. Eve-ry air<:'#aft c01n1nanded by a person in military
service detailed for the purpose s:Qall be deemed to be a military
aircraft.
ART. 32. No military aircraft of a contracting State shall fly
over the territory of another contracting State nor land thereon
without special authorisation. In case of such authorisation the
military aircraft shall enjoy, in principle, in the absence of
special stipulation the privileges which are customarily accorded
to foreign ships of war.
A military aircraft which is forced to land or which is reque~ted or sumn1oned to land shall by reason thereof acquire no
right to the privileges referred to in the above paragraph.
ARr. 33. Special arrangements between the States concerned
will determine in what cases police and custoins aircraft may be
authorised to cross the frontier. They shall in no case be entitled to the privileges referred to in Article· 32. (XI League of
Nations Treaty Series, p. 173 ( 1922) . )

These principles, some,vhat elaborated, :formed a part
o:f the rules dra,vn up at The Hague in 1923 as is stated
in the report o:f the Com1nission. It was recognized,
ho,vever, that "a clear distinction must be n1ade between
aircra:ft that :form a part o:f the co1nbatant :forces in time
o:f war and those which do not." Accordingly a rule
'vas dra,vn up as article 3 that "A 1nilitary aircra:ft shall
bear an external n1ark indicating its nationality and military character " while article 5 stated, "Public non-military aircra:ft other than those employed :for customs or
police purposes shall in time o:f vvar bear the same externalinarks, and :for the purposes o:f these rules shall be
treated on the same :footing, as private aircra:ft." (1924
Naval vVar College, International Law Documents, p.
110.)
Seaplanes and neut1"al waters.-It is admitted in all
proposed regulations that aircra:ft in distress 1nay enter
neutral jurisdiction. Red Cross aircra:ft are also perInitted to enter, as are aircra:ft on board ships o:f war.
It has :further been generally held that an aircra:ft
taking off :from a vessel o:f war 'vithin neutral 'vaters or
entering the neutral aerial jurisdiction is liable to internment.
73500-34--5
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The report of the Commission of Jurists at The Hague,
in 1923, stated that,
The obligation on the part of the neutral Power to intern covers
not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents. The obligation is not affected by the circumstances which led to the military aircraft coming within the jurisdiction. It applies whether
the belligerent aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction, Yoluntarily
or involuntarily, and whatever the cause. It is an obligation owed
to the opposing belligerent and is based upon the fact that the
aircraft has co1ne into an area where it is not subject to attack
by its opponent. * * *
The obligation to intern belligerent military aircraft entering
neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern the personnel. These will in general be combatant 1nembers of the belligerent fighting forces, but experience has already shown that in
time of war military aeroplanes are employed for transporting
passen·gers. As it may safely be assun1ed that in time of war a
passenger would not be carried on a belligerent military aircraft
unless his journey was a matter of importance to the Government,
it seems reasonable also to comprise such passengers in the category of persons t? be interned.
"ARTICLE 42.

"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to
prevent the entry 'vithin its jurisdiction of belligerent military
q.ircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered such
\urisdiction.
"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal, to
intern any belligerent military aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together
with its crew and the passengers, if any." (1924 Naval 'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 133.)

Article 46 of these rules speaks of " departure by air
of any aircraft." Whether a seaplane arriving and departing by water would receive different treabnent is not
stated. It 1night be queried 'vhether aerial or n1ariti1ne
navigation is the auxiliary or principal fact in use of a
hydroplane. Article 42 apparently is drawn with reference to aircraft which in flight enter neutral jurisdiction, though the second paragraph might strictly be extended to a seaplane 'vhich had alighted outside and
navigated 'vithin neutral jurisdiction.
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. Gern~an protest to United' States, 1915.-In a comJnunication of the Ger1nan Ambassador, J. Bernstorff,
of January 19, 1915, to the Secretary of State, there
\Yas mentioned certain data which the Ambassador understood to be reliable in regard to hy_dro-aeroplanes. In
concluding, the Ambassador said,
There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regarded as
war vessels whose delivery to belligerent states by neutrals
should be stopped under Article 8 of the thirteenth convention
of the Seconu Hague Conference of October 18, 1907. [Art. 8. A
neutral Government is bound to employ the 1neans at its disposal
to preYent the fitting out or arming of every v~essel within its
jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise,
or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that
Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same
vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of every
vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which
has been, within the said jurisdiction, adapted, entirely or in
part, for use in war.] Hydro-aeroplanes are not mentioned by
name in the convention simply because there was none in 1907
at the time of the conference.
On the supposition that hydro-aeroplanes are delivered to
belligerents against the 'vishes of the Government of the United
States, I have the honor to bring the foregoing to your excellency's kind knowledge. (1915 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 776.)

To this communication the Secretary of State 1nade a
somewhat full reply on January 29, 1915:
ExcELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your excellency's note of the 19th instant, and in reply have
to inform you that the statements contained in your excellency's
note have received my careful consideration in view of the earnest
purpose of this Government to perfor1n every duty which is imposed upon it as a neutral by treaty stipulation and international
Jaw.
The essential statement i~ your note, which implies an obligation on the part of this Government to interfere in the sale and
delivery of hydro-aeroplanes to belligerent powers, is:
"There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regardert as
war vessels whose delivery to belligerent states by neutrals should
be stopped unde'r Article 8 of the thirteenth convention of the
Second Hague Conference of October 18, 1907."
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As to this assertion of the character of hydro-aeroplanes I
submit the following comn1ents: The fact that a hydro-aeropiane
is fitted with apparatus to rise from and alight upon the sea
does not in my opinion give it the character of a vessel any n1ore
than the wheels attached to an aeroplane fitting it to rise from
and alight upon land give the latter the character of a land vehicle. Both the hydro-aeroplane and the aeroplane are essentially aircraft; as an aid in military operations they can only
be used in the air. The fact that one starts its flight from the
surface of the sea and the other from the land is a mere incident which in no way affects their aerial character.
In view of these facts I must. dissent from your excellency's
assertion that " there is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be
regarded as war vessels," and consequently I do not regard the
obligations imposed by treaty or by the accepted rules of international law applicable to aircraft of any sort.
In this connection I further call to your excellency's attention
that according to the latest advices received by this Department
the German Imperial Government include "balloons and flying
rnachines and their component parts" in the list of conditional
contraband, and that in the Imperial prize ordinance, drafted
Septernber 30, 1909, and issued in the Reichs-Gesetzbla tt on
August 3, 1914, appear as conditional contraband " airships and
flying machines" (Article 23, section 8). It thus appears that
the Imperial Government have placed and still retain aircraft
of all descriptions in the class of conditional contraband, for 'vhich
no special treatment involving neutral duty is, so far as I arn
advised, provided by any treaty to which the United States is a
signatory or adhering power.
As in the views of this Department the provisions of Convention
XIII of the Second Hague Conference do not apply to hydroaeroplanes I do not consider it necessary to discuss the question
as to whether those provisions are in force during the present
war. (Ibid., p. 780.)

Probably the statement of the Secretary of State that
he did "not regard the obligations i~mposed by treaty or
by the accepted rules of international law applicable to
aircraft of any sort" 'vas to be taken merely as en1phasizing his interpretation of neutral obligations as regards this particular case rather than as regards all
possible cases.
Analogy of aerial and 1nariti1n-e rules.· It has often
been 1naintained that aerial and 1naritiine rules should

DUE DILIGENCE AND AIRCRAFT

63

be the san1e. ~Iany of these ideas are due to the use for
aircraft of the sa1ne 'vords and phrases that are used for
1narine craft. Such 'vords as ships, navigation, landing,
pilots, registry, papers, right-of-w·ay, etc., are in the marine and aerial vocabularies but the application 1nay be
quite unlike.
1'he analogy fails 'vhen consideration is given to the
nature of ships of the sea and of the air, speed and
range of navigation, place of landing, use of pilots, etc.
These differences must be taken into the reckoning when
the responsibility of the neutral is to be estimated even
under the rule of clue diligence.
D·ue d-i ligence as to airc1~aft.-The rule requiring of a
neutral state exercise of clue diligence in n1aintaining
its neutrality has been interpreted as obliging the neutral
state to use the "Ineans at its disposal." If the interpretation put upon the 'vords, "due diligence", in the
Alaban1a case, i.e. diligence in "exact proportion to the
risks 'vhich either of the belligerents 1nay be exposed
fro1n failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality '' is
to be applied to aircraft, the safe rule 'vould be to prohibit under liability to intern1nent the entrance of airera ft to neutral jurisdiction.
The risk fro1n the entrance to neutral territory of belligerent land forces entails internment for the period of
the war. Under certain conditions the internn1ent of
vessels of a belligerent 1nay be necessary in order that
neutrality may be Inaintained but ordinarily the n1ove1nents of vessels are sufficiently under control so that
neither belligerent is prejudiced unduly if a degree of
equality in granting privileges essential to keep the vessels sea,vorthy is granted. The risk fro1n aircraft is
relatively so n1uch greater that the neutral has forbidden
entrance to neutral jurisdiction under penalty of internInent except to hospital aircraft.
Naval War 0 ollege opinion, 191~.-\V'hile aircraft had
been only moderately developed before 1912, the Naval
\V' ar College had given attention to certain aspects of
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aerial navigation. In referring to the analogy of taking
coal for naval vessels and gas for balloons, in the Situations for 1912 it was said,
Even with this extension of the right of coaling, the entrance
of a balloon into neutral territory may be in n1arkecl contrast to
the entrance of a v·essel of war into a neutral port. One belligerent may easily learn of the entrance of a vessel of his enemy
to a neutral port. The course which the vessel will follow on
departure, the time of sojourn, and other facts may be reasonably
determined. A vessel in a neutral port Inust ordinarily put to
sea before reaching a home or an enemy port. A belligerent would
ordinarily, therefore have an opportunity to meet and to engage
the vessel of his opponent in an area where battle is lawful and
without material risk to the neutral.
It is possible, however, that the territory of States might be so
situated that a neutral State might be directly between the t'vo
belligerents; e.g., if war existed between Germany and Spain.
In such a case would the bringing of a vvar balloon to the French
frontier fron1 Germany place France under any obligation to permit the balloon to enter and take the necessary gas to make it
navigable? If German balloons were pennitted to enter French
territory, take gas, and from points of advantage attack Spanish
forces and territory, would such permission by France be analogous
to the entrance of German troops, or would it be the use of
French territory as a base? "\Vhether or not the right of absolute
sovereignty in the air is in the subjacent State, certainly France
vvoulcl be under no obligation to receive a Gennan war balloon
into its territory when France is neutral except on ground of
humanity or vis 1najor. France could scarcely pennit German
war balloons to use French territory as a point from which to
attack Spain, and ·if German forces should enter French territory
internment would be the penalty. (1921 Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 85.)

It 'vas at that time pointed out that the situation would
be n1odified if the aircraft 1naintained continuous physical contact and was appurtenant to a cruiser or si1nilar
vessel.
II ague rtttles, 19£3.-The Con1n1ission of Jurists to
Consider and Report upon the Rules of \Varfare 'vhich
'vas appointed under provisions of a resolution of the
"\Vashington Conference of 1922 reported upon radio and
aircraft in 1923. In this report it 'vas said,
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No attempt has been made to formulate a definition of the
term "aircraft," nor to enumerate the various categories of
n1achines which are covered by the term. A statement of the
broad principle that the rules adopted apply to all types of aircraft has been thought sufficient, and article 1 has been framed
for this purpose.
"ARTICLE 1

"The rules of aerial \Yarfare apply to all aircraft, whether
lighter or heavier than air, irrespective of whether they are, or
are not, capable of floating on the water." (1924 Naval \Var
College, Int. Law Documents, p. 108.)

'Vhile these rules have not been ratified, they embodied the opinion of the delegates from six naval
powers and are therefore worthy of careful consideration.
Dependent aircraft.-It has gradually become custoJnary to add to the naval fighting forces aircraft carriers or vessels having facilities for carriage of aircraft.
For so1ne years it had generally been the rule that such
aircraft should be regarded while on the sh 1p as part
of the ship. This 1natter had been considered at The
Hague in 1923 and the Report of the Commission explains that,
The customary rules of international law authorise the adinission of belligerent warships to neutral ports and waters. There
is no obligation upon neutral States to admit warships belonging to belligerent States, but it is not in general refused. The
admission of belligerent military aircraft, however, is prohibited
by article 40, and account 1nust therefore be taken of the fact
that it has now become the practice for warships to have a
certain nu1nber of aircraft assigned to them and that these
aircraft usually rest on board the \varship. 'Vhile they remain
on board the warship they form part of it, and should be regarded as such fr01n the point of view of the regulations issued
by the neutral States. They will therefore be allowed to enter
the neutral jurisdiction on the same footing as the warship on
board \Yhich they rest, but they n1ust remain on board the
warship and 1nust not commit any act which t~e \Varship is not
allowed to comn1it.
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"ARTICLE 41.

"Aircraft on board vessel of war, including aircraft-can:iers,
shall be regarded as part of such vessels." (1924 Naval 'Var
College, Int. Law Documents, p. 131.)

Aircraft over neutral jurisdiction.-The practice and
general opinion before the. end of the World "'\Var supported the right of a neutral state to exclude all belligerent aircraft fron1 the air above its land. Aircraft
were generally excluded from air above the land by proelama tion or decree of some kind. The early or dina nee
of Switzerland, August 4, 1914, was explicit as to the
right of the s,viss Govern1nent to control this aerial
space.
17. As to aviation, attention will be given to what folliJws:
(a) Balloons. and air craft not belonging to the Swiss Array
can not rise and navigate in the aerial space situated above our
territory unless the persons ascending in the apparatus are
furnished with a special authorization, delivered in the territory
occupied by the anny, by the conunander of the anny : in the
rest of the country, by the Federal military department:
(b) The passage of all balloons and air craft con1ing frmn
abroad into our aerial space is forbidden. It will be oppos<~cl if
necessary by all available 1neans and these air craft will he
controlled whenever that appears aclvantageous.
(c) In case of the landing of foreign balloons or air craft, their
passengers will be conducted to the nearest superior Inilitary c\nnmander who will act according to his instructions. The apparatus and the articies which it contains ought, in any case,
to be seized by the Inilitary authorities or the police. The Ft)dernl Inilitary deparbnent or the conunander of the army will decide what ought to be done with the personnel and Inaterial of
a balloon or air craft cOining into our territory through force
1najeure and when there appears to be no reprehensible intention or negligence.
(1916 Naval 'Var College, International Law
Topics, p. 73.)

The Procla1nation of the United States in regarc1 to
the Panama Canal Zone and the cities and harbors of
Panama and Colon was con1prehensive:
Rule 16.-Air craft of a belligerent power, public or private,
are forbidden to descend' or arise within the jurisdiction of the
United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air

INTERNMENT

67

spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdic-tion.
(1915 Naval \Var College, International Law Topics, p. 14.)

I nt&nmen.t.-Interninent of vessels of vvar is a relatively 1nodern practice. It first became generally recognized in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. The
Hague Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Po,vers in lVIaritin1e Law of 1907, Article 24,
stated the right of intern1nent and outlined the procedure of intern1nent. Provision vvas made for interning
vessels of vvar in n1any of the neutrality proclan1ations
and regulations during the 'Vorld "\Var.
The analogous principle had been earlier a ppliecl to
belligerent land fo,rces entering upon neutral territory.
rrhe interninent of aircraft unless attached to a vessel
vvas the rule during the \V orld 'V ar and prohibitions of
flight over neutral jurisdiction 'vere com1non as in the
Italian decree of Septen1ber 3, 1914.
ARTIOLE 1. It is forbidden for any apparatus or means of aerial
locomotion, such as dirigibles, aeroplanes, hydroplan ~ s. balloons,
flying kites, or captive balloons, etc., to fly or as~Putl over any
points of territory of the state or colonies or of the territorial
seas, except for those established by 1nilitary authorities and for
otller aeronautics that are authorized fron1 tilne to time by the
1ninisters of war and navy. No pennission will be granted to
any foreigners.

Air'craft and outbreak of 1VorZd W ar.-When the GerInan A1nbassador 'vithdre'v fro1n Paris, August 3, 1914,
he said in his letter to the President of the Council, M.
Viviani:
The German adn1inistrative and n1ilitary authorities have
established a certain nu1nber of flagrantly hostile acts com1nitted
on German territory by French military aviators. Several of
these have openly violated: the neutrality of Belgium by flying
over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy
buildings near \Vesel ; others have been seen in the district of
the Eifel; one has thrown bmnbs on the railway near Carlsruhe
and Nuremberg.
I a1n instructed, and I have the honor to inform your excellency that in the presence of these acts of aggression the GerInan Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in
consequence of the acts of this latter power. (1917 Naval \Var
College, International Law Documents, p, 103.)
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In the reply M. Viviani said,
I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday
addressed to him · a note- protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of Gern1an troops. (French Yellow Book, No. 148.)

Proclamation of United States, February ~8, 1918.Soon after the United States entered the World War as a
belligerent, it found problems arising from the use of
aircraft and on February 28, 1918, a proclamation was
issued requiring license from government authorities for
any person flying over certain areas, and no private flying
was to be permitted after 30 days from February 28. (40
U.S.Stat., Pt. 2, 1753). The presumption would under
such circumstances be that all aircraft of the registry of
the United States would from that date be public aircraft and liable to be treated accordingly.
Spaight's opinion.-J. M. Spaight who has given much
attention to laws relating to aircraft gives certain practical arguments for refusal of entrance to belligerent
aircraft within neutral jurisdiction.
The pre-,var argument for refusing to belligerent aircraft the
right to circulate in neutral atmosphere, namely, that such a
right must be accorded to both or neither of the belligerents, and
that if accorded to both there must always be the danger of conflicts above neutral soil, with consequent danger to life and property below, received a concrete confirmation in an occurrence of
the war. In December, 1917, it was reported that an ael'ial coincat took place over Swiss territory, and that as a result a good
deal of damage was caused near l\1uttenz by the fall of bombs.
Other combats also occurred over neutral territory-over Aardenburg (Zeeland), for instance, in January, 1918; over Cadzand in
April, 1918; and over Ameland in July, 1918. The fact that such
incidents can occur is the best answer to the question which has
been asked-,Vhy should not the maritime rule of entry of neutral
jurisdiction apply to aircraft? The a.nswer is, in brief, that the
circumstances are dissimilar, and that the practical objections to
allowing entry of aircraft outweight any advantages that 'vould
result fron1 applying the naval rule. The question has often been
considered, and the general conclusion has been in favour of
prohibition of entry. ( Spaight, Air Power and "Tar Rights, 2d
ed., p. 422.)
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nir. Spaight also adds that exceptions to the prohibition of entrance should not be made and were not
n1ade on account of force majeure, error in crossing a
neutral frontier or other reason. This position was embodied in the rules drawn up by the Con1mission of
Jurists at The Hague in 1923 in article 40 which forbade
to belligerent n1ilitary aircraft entrance to neutral
jurisdiction.
·
The 24-hour rule.-Gradually there evolved a rule that
the sa1ne regulations should be applied 'by neutrals to
the vessels of war of each belligerent sojourning in the
neutral port. As vessels of war changed in character,
there 'vere varying proposals as to the length of time of
per1nitted sojourn and of the interval between the sailing of vessels of different nationalities. Even during
the 'Vorld ~Var distinctions among different types of
vessels were for a tin1e made. The Brazilian rules of
August 4, 1914, contained the following provision :
ART. 18th. If warships of two belligerents happen to be together in a Brazilian port or harbor, an interval of twenty-four
hours shall elapse between the sailing of one of then1 and the
sailing of her enemy, if both are stea1ners. If the first to sail is
a sailing Yessel and the next being an enemy is a steamer, three
c1ays' aclntnce will be given to the first belligerent ship. Their
time of sailing will be counted from their respectiYe arrivals,
exceptions being made for the cases in which a prolongation of
stay 1nay be granted. A belligerent ship of war cannot leave a
Brazilian port before the departure of a merchant ship under an
enemy flag, but n1ust respect the aforesaid provisions concerning the intervals of departure between steamers and sailing
vessels. (1H16 Naval War College, International Law Topics,

p. 12.)

The rule comn1only called the 24- hour rule was generally accepted. By this rule 24 hours was the limit of
sojourn of a belligerent vessel of war in a neutral port
under ordinary circumstances and 24 hours must elapse
between the departure of vessels of war of opposing
belligerents. The reason for the establishing of this
period 'vas that neither belligerent should be able to
obtain an advantage over the other by entering neutral
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ports. It ·was thought 24 hours of sailing time 'vould
enable the leading vessel to reach a point "~here pursuit
'vould be in1probable.
1"'he sailing distance of a surface vessel in 24 hours
'vould, ho,veYer, be a relatively short journey for an aircraft. It 'vas early seen that the 24-hour rule 'vould not
be practicable as bet,veen aircraft and of little use bet,veen air and surface craft. The only safe rule for the
neutral 'vas soon discovered to be to prohibit entrance
of aircraft and to intern any that transgressed this
regulation.
Resun~e.-""\Vhile the final issue of the effort to adjust
Philippine relations is still ( 1933) uncertain, the plan
set forth in the Act of January 17, 1933, is one of the
most definite thus far proposed and seriously considered.
This plan 'vould specially involYe the vie,ving of the Act .
fron1 three points of vie,v. the attitude and consequences
for ( 1) the United States; ( 2) the Philippine Islands;
and ( 3) other states.
The United States has in passing the Act of January
17, 1933, over the President's veto, presumably set forth
the policy 'vhich it is 'villing to pursue. This involves
independence for the Islands after 10 years under specified conditions.
1"'he Philippine Legislature has in failing to approve
the conditions in the Act of January 17, 1933, indicated
that the conditions are unsatisfactory and subsequently
that certain a1nenchnents in the act 'Yere essential.
Other states 'vould be interested in any changes 'vhich
n1ight be 1nade in the status of the Philippine Islands because introducing ne'v factors into the international politics of the Pacific and Far East, 'vhere conditions are already uncertain. ""\Vhile so1ne for1n of neutralization
1night involve less serious problen1s for a ti1ne than " . . ould
independence " . . ithout such an agree1nent, there are still
1nany problen1s even under neutralization if precedents
can be Inn de a basis of jndgn1ent. X o". . the relations are
bet"~een the United States and foreign po,Yers. The ad-
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clitional relations which 'voulcl £ollo,v, i£ Philippine independence is established, W'oulcl be these which arise 'vhen
a ne'v state enters the £an1ily o£ nations. I£ neutraliza- .
tion o£ the Philippine Islands eventuates, not 1nerely the
Islands enter new' international relations but all the
parties to the neutralization enter new relations to one
another as well as to nonparticipating states.
Further, it 1nay be questioned whether the Philippine
Islands, on the frontier between the Eastern and Western
oriels, 'vould feel assured o£ their independence 'vithout more definite sanctions than are ordinarily embodied
in neutralization agree1nents. As states are not yet accustoined to £ollo'v altruistic policies, it is doubtful
w·hether there w·oulcl be sufficient advantages eventually
flo,ving from the neutralization o£ the Islands to 'varrant
commihnents 'vhich n1ight involve sacrifices on the part
o£ the states -vvhose participation would be essential for
effective neutralization.
By the hypothesis o£ situation II the Philippine
Islands have been granted their independence and this
independence 1nay or 1nay not be accompanied by neutralization. I£ the Philippine Islands are not neutralized, all the rights and obligations of any state would
reside in the Con1monw'ealth o£ the Philippine Islands.
As regards seaplanes, general practice seems to recognize
that a great degree o£ risk is involved in their InoveInents and that a neutral has a corresponding obligation in controlling their 1noven1ents. Internment has
co1ne to be regarded as the proper course o£ action on the_
part o£ a neutral. Other states may justly condition
their action to a reasonable degree upon the effectiveness.
o£ the action o£ the neutral.
I£ the Co1n1nonwealth o£ the Philippine Islands is
neutralized, the respective states parties to the neutralization treaty will probably, judging £ro1n precedent, assume
as little obligation as possible. The obligations o£ the
Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands remain as.
'vould be the case without any neutralization treaty unless the treaty specifically provides otherwise.

''T
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1. In case the Philippine Islands obtain independence
and are not neutralized:
(a) The Philippine Government should intern the seaplane.
(b) The Yamba may request assurances from the Philippine Government to the effect that the seaplane has
been or immediately will be interned.
(c) The Namba may inquire whether the seaplane has
been or in11nediately is to be interned and may govern its
movements accordingly.
(d) The Usa has no legal concern with the matter.
2. In case the Philippine Islands are neutralized:
(a) The Philippine Government should intern the seaplane.
(b) If state Y is a party to the neutralization treaty,
the Y an~ba may perform such services as rest upon that
vessel under the treaty, but if state Y is not a party to
the treaty, even though other states may be parties, the
Yamba Inay request assurances from the Philippine Government to the effect that the seaplane has been or in1mediately will be interned.
( o) If state N is a party to the neutralization treaty,
the Namba may perform such services as rest upon that
vessel under the treaty, but if state N is not a party to
the treaty, even though other states 1nay be parties, the
Na1nba may inquire whether the seaplane has been or
immediately is to be interned and may govern its n1ovements accordingly.
(d) If the United States is, as may be inferred fron1
the Act of January 17, 1933, a party to the treaty of
neutralization, the Usa may perforn1 such services as
rest upon that vessel under the treaty, but if the United
States is not a party, even though other states 1nay be
parties, the Usa has no legal concern 'vith the 1natter.

